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Why Good Engineers Make Bad Decisions:
Some Implications for ADR Professionals
Melvin Blumberg*
Introduction

I.

The purpose of this paper is to provide commentary and comment

from a social science perspective on the ethical responses of engineering
professionals to pressures linked to their technical decisions. Particular
emphasis is placed on pressures generated by the broader, socioeconomic, political, and organizational milieu in which these technical
decisions are made. Part II introduces and develops a framework for the
examination of ethical behavior. It explores, in a preliminary way, the
multiplicity of pressures impinging on engineering decisions. Part III
presents a framework for ethical behavior that differentiates among
ethics, ethical choice, and ethical behavior. Part IV examines a case
study showing the impact of external factors on engineering decisions.
Finally, Part V examines general implications for the improvement of
response mechanisms to pressures faced by engineers and provides
cautious suggestions for Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR")
professionals.

Professor of Management, School of Business Administration, Penn State
Harrisburg; B.S. in Engineering, Widener University; M.B.A., University of Pittsburgh;
Ph.D. in Organizational Behavior, The Pennsylvania State University. The author is
grateful to Drs. Joseph R. Herkert, Howard G. Sachs, and Leo Smyth for their careful
reading of earlier versions of this manuscript, and for their many constructive and
insightful suggestions. Responsibility for interpretation of facts and conclusions is the
author's alone.
*
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II.

Framework for the Examination of Ethical Behavior

A.

Who Is a Professional?'
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For present purposes, we view professionals as an identifiable class
of persons with extensive training and education, who, if licensure is
required, may be somehow empowered by the state in return for a
commitment to serve the public good, and who practice an art or science
linked to an organization that controls the entrance to the field and
regulates its members. The regulation of professionals is usually
accomplished through rules, regulations, standards, and codes, both
written and unwritten.2 Fields that clearly meet these criteria are
engineering,3 medicine, law, nursing, theology, and education.4
Well-trained and experienced professionals in a particular field, at a
given point in time, can usually agree on the "correct" answer to a
particular question such as, for example, selecting the "best" method to
depreciate a car, remove an appendix, or draft a will. However, there is a
time dimension to professional judgments. Professional fields are
dynamic and their members are continually advancing the "state of the
art." The "correct" answers today are surely different from what they
were in 1903, and different from what they will be in 2103. In this sense,
professions are continually evolving, and one of their primary control
mechanisms, professional codes of conduct, must evolve just as quickly.
As the subject matter of each field becomes more complex, the codes of
conduct for coping with changing expectations for practitioners also tend
to become more complex. Thus, the evolution of professions is mirrored
in the evolutions of their codes of ethical conduct.5

1. For two sources that were particularly helpful in writing this section, see
S. GUNN & P. AARNE VESILIND, HOLD PARAMOUNT: THE ENGINEER'S

ALASTAIR

RESPONSIBILITY TO SOCIETY (2003); E.R. KLEIN, PEOPLE FIRST! PROFESSIONAL AND
BUSINESS ETHICS WITHOUT ETHICS (2003).

2.

For links to over 850 professional ethical codes, and resources for writing codes

of ethics, see Illinois Institute of Technology, Center for the Study of Ethics in the
Professions, at http://www.iit.edu/departments/csep/PublicWWW/codes/index.html (last
visited Jun. 28, 2003).
3. For cases, discussions, and ethical guidelines in science and engineering, see
Case Western Reserve University, Online Ethics Centerfor Science and Engineering,at
http://www.onlineethics.org (last visited Jun. 28, 2003).

4.
5.

See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 541.3 (2003).
For an insightful discussion of the manner and mechanisms of change in

professional realms, see HOWARD GARDNER ET AL., GOOD WORK: WHEN EXCELLENCE

AND ETHICS MEET (2001).
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The Importance of Ethical Behavior

Business organizations are showing an increasing interest in the
ethical behavior of their officers and other professional employees. As a
result of recent revelations of wrong-doing, corporations have not only
become increasingly exposed to legal sanctions and public censure, but
have also seen their stock valuations deeply discounted because
are viewed by potential investors as being
corporate financial statements
6
of dubious credibility.
The education, skill, and centrality to operations of professional
employees provide them with an opportunity to contribute substantially
However, this centrality to
to the success of their organizations.
employees with an equal
professional
provides
also
operations
opportunity to damage an organization substantially through their
mistakes. This tends to be particularly true for engineers. When an
engineer makes mistakes, whether it involves violations of professional
ethics and errors in judgment, or is the result of external forces,
For example, airplanes can crash,
devastating effects can occur.
submarines can sink, automobiles can blow up, or reactors can melt
down. Where loss of life or significant monetary loss occurs, there is
typically a widely publicized inquiry to determine causes and affix
blame. Fortunately, these inquiries also provide a wealth of information
and learning opportunities that are useful for improving professional
ethics and standards for engineers and other professionals.
1II.

Framework for Ethical Behavior that Differentiates Among Ethics,
Ethical Choice, and Ethical Behavior

A.

Value Systems

For present purposes, we will differentiate among ethics, ethical
choice, and ethical behavior. According to Charles E. Scott, ethics is
taken "to mean the body of values by which a culture understands and
interprets itself with regard to what is good and bad.",7 We define an
individual's ethics as a system of values that motivates, directs, and
controls a person's choice of behaviors based upon the expectation that
the behavioral outcomes of the choice will have some consequence that
can be described as being good or bad, desirable or undesirable, right or
wrong, moral or immoral, as understood and interpreted by the larger
6. See Melvin Blumberg & Mukund Kulkarni, Hershey Sale Was Not a Prudent
FinancialDecision Either, HERSHEY CHRON., Oct. 10, 2002.
7. CHARLES E. SCOTT, THE QUESTION OF ETHICS: NIETZSCHE, FOUCAULT,
HEIDEGGER (John Sallis ed., 1990).
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culture in which the behavior occurs. 8 Ethical choice is the selection of
one or more possible ethical behaviors, and ethical behavior is one or
more outcomes of ethical choice.
It is useful to think of an ethical value system as a nested
hierarchical system composed of four interrelated subsystems that differ
primarily in the manner in which they motivate and control behavior.
They are: (1) Idealism; (2) Professionalism; (3) Standardization; and (4)
Routinization.
Idealism motivates and controls behavior almost entirely through a
person's internalized belief in the inherent "rightness" of his or her
preferred outcomes. This value subsystem is perhaps the most powerful
motivator of behavior, and the one least subject to external pressure.
Ideals are outcomes that can be approached without limit but can never
be attained. 9 Examples of ideals include the notions of equal justice
under the law and returning ill people to as near normal function as
possible.
Professionalism motivates behavior primarily through the
satisfaction a person derives from using highly valued talents and
abilities in the performance of a work role. Control is primarily internal
to the person and informed by the knowledge of possible review,
recognition, and praise by peers, or censure and sanctions imposed by
peers or law. Examples include a skilled teacher who derives pleasure
from seeing students succeed, or a skilled orthopedic surgeon who
frequently is able to restore complete mobility to patients.
Standardization provides general expectations for behavior,
generally by a person's co-workers. Behavior is motivated primarily by
the rewards that follow it. Control is primarily external, occurring
through compliance to the standards themselves or the loss of rewards
that accompany compliance. For example, accreditation standards for
colleges and universities provide expectations that, when met, are
rewarded with accreditation of the college's programs, or loss of
accreditation when they are no longer being met
Routinization is the most elementary value subsystem, motivating
behavior almost entirely from external sources, usually through rules and
procedures. Rules are demands for compliance that can control behavior
only to the extent that those promulgating them are accepted and
recognized as having the legitimacy to do so, or to the extent that the
rules can be enforced by legal means.
8. There is an overwhelming amount of literature, developed literally over several
thousand years, covering the philosophy of ethics. Unfortunately, we shall have to forego
a discussion of that literature and stipulate that, however arrived at, ethical values exist
and affect behavior.
9.

RUSSELL L. ACKOFF & FRED E. EMERY, ON PURPOSEFUL SYSTEMS 57 (1972).
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Each subsystem of values pieces out, elaborates upon, and
explicates the one above it in the hierarchy. For example, an ideal for a
hospital might be an accident-free workplace. This ideal might be
enacted in part by the expectation that all employees act professionally
by exercising good judgment in handling sharp instruments. A derived
standard might be: "Dispose of all used needles properly." A derived
rule might be: "Put used needles in the red container." The design of a
professional code of ethics can begin with any subsystem, and progress
in either direction. For example, we might begin with the ideal of equal
justice for all, and then determine the expectations for professional
behavior necessary to enact that value through a hierarchal branching of
standards and rules. We might also begin with a set of rules, and infer
the standards that they are designed to enact.
Decision choice is the selection from among a set of alternatives,
the best alternative, or combination of alternatives as evaluated by an
individual's values. Behavior is the outcome of decision choice. Ethical
behavior is generally taken to be purposive and voluntary, contrasted
with other behaviors that are reflexive and involuntary. It also includes
current behavior that appears to be reflexive, but is actually habitual
behavior resulting from voluntary decisions made in the past. Successful
application of skills and training to decision making, with outcomes that
are both optimal and ethical when the decision is made, may result in
outcomes that are no longer either optimal or ethical as a result of
environmental shift. This situation in which the decision maker's
abilities become inadequacies or blind spots has been termed "trained
incapacity." 10
B.

Capitulationto the Routine, or Routinization of the Routine?

Based on the arguments above, a certain degree of "routinization" is
not necessarily an indicator of a drift away from high aspirations within a
field. It can also be an indictor of the maturity level of the field. More
mature fields would be expected to have a higher degree of established
routine than newer fields. One mechanism through which this occurs isl
referred to in management theory as the "exception principle.""
Inherent in this principle is the recognition that managers attempt to
10. Robert K. Merton, BureaucraticStructure and Personality,SOCIAL FORCES 56068 (1940), reprintedin JOSEPH A LITTERER, ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR
240-47 (2d ed. 1969).
11. The exception principle, or "management by exception," is often discussed in
introductory texts in management and supervision, usually without attribution. For the
earliest source of which the author is aware for this concept, see Frederick W. Taylor,
Shop Management, Presentation to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(1903), reprintedin FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 126 (1947).
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make the highest and best use of their skills, training, and time by
reducing routine and repetitive tasks to programs, policies, rules, and
standard procedures. These programs, policies, rules, and standard
procedures are then delegated to others to operate the routine, thereby
freeing up the manager to deal with the "exceptional" cases and
problems.
A dysfunctional consequence of routinization is the phenomenon
known as "goal displacement,"' 12 a situation in which strict adherence to
rules that were originally established to achieve certain ends become
ends in themselves. For example, to gain control over increasing travel
expenses, a well-known university implemented a policy requiring that
all reservations be placed in advance through the university travel office.
The travel office then directly billed the traveler's academic department.
Strict adherence to this policy resulted in increased costs when airlines
began to offer short-term price discounts via the Internet, sometimes
shortly before or during a weekend. When faculty attempted to take
advantage of these discounts by purchasing tickets with university credit
cards, the travel office refused to authorize reimbursement because it was
a violation of university rules.
C. The Multiple Antecedents of Behavior
Values are not the only forces driving behavior. At any given
instant, people are at sea with a torrent of forces attempting to energize
and direct their behavior. The process model below in Figure 1 shows
thirty-eight variables that research has demonstrated to be important
drivers of behavior, and establishes a matrix of enabling and inhibiting
13
forces for ethical choice and subsequent ethical or unethical behavior.
It can be seen quite clearly from Figure 1 that "values" are only one of a
multiplicity of drivers of behavior. Additionally, not all behavior is
overt. For example, thinking and decision making are forms of behavior
that can only be inferred by observing the overt behavior to which they
lead, and this inference is frequently flawed.

12. Merton, supra note 10.
13. See Melvin Blumberg & Charles Pringle, The Missing Opportunity in
OrganizationalResearch: Some Implications for a Theory of Work Performance, 7
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 560 (1982).

2003]

WHY GOOD ENGINEERS MAKE BAD DECISIONS

Figure 1. A Process Model of Ethical Behavior
Behavioral Antecedents
Motivation
Job satisfaction
Job status
Anxiety
Legitimacy of participation
Attitude
Perceived task characteristic,
Job involvement
Ego involvement
Self image
Personality
Norms
Values
Perceived role expectations
Feelings of equity
Incentives and rewards
Age
Ability
State of health
Knowledge
Skills
Intelligence
Level of education
Endurance
Stamina
Energy level
Motor skills
Tools
Equipment
Materials and supplies
Working conditions
Actions of coworkers
Leader behavior
Mentorism
Organizational policies,
rules, and procedures
Information
Time
Incentives and rewards

Process

Behavior

Choice
Decision
(Ethical or Unethical Behavior)
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The Decision choice process shown in Figure 1 follows the wellknown classical model of rational choice. 14 The model consists of the
following eight steps:
1. Recognize the need to make a decision.
2. Identify all possible alternative solutions.
3. Assign value to each of the alternatives according to some
criterion/objective.
4. Rank order the alternatives.
5. Select the best alternative.
6. Implement the decision.
7. Evaluate the outcome.
15
8. Recycle to Step One.

Different behavioral antecedents shown in Figure 1 seem to be more
controlling of the choice process at different steps in the decision
process. For example, in Step One of the rational choice model, norms,
ability, intelligence, time, and information seem to be the most helpful.
Values enter into the decision process most obviously in Step Three
where value is assigned to alternatives; in Step Five where the best
alternative is selected; and in Step Seven where the decision is evaluated.
Although many other factors are involved in the choice process, it is
clear from this perspective that ethics is not external to the decision
process. It is not something merely tacked on and considered as an
afterthought; it is at the very core of the decision process.
D.

Limitations of Ethical Choice

When an ethical lapse occurs, the typical assumption is that it
results from idiosyncratic values and behavior of one or more misfits,
troublemakers, or prima donnas. Supposedly, the necessary corrective
action is to "weed out" these few people and punish them so harshly that
14.

See JAMES G.

MARCH

&

HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS

137-69 (1958). It

is interesting to note that these are essentially the same steps used in the engineering
design process.
15. Id.
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no one will ever again consider engaging in similar behavior. This
approach is typically followed up with new rules and oversight, or
"watchdog," committees. However, the truth is much more complicated
than this.
W. Edwards Deming differentiated between problems with specific
and unique causes, and problems with causes that are systemic in
nature.' 6 He referred to the former as "special causes," and the latter as
"common causes."'17 Deming estimated that the vast majority of
problems experienced in organizations result from common causes, that
is, systemic rather than individual inadequacies. For example, I was
once requested by one of the senior partners of an electrical contracting
company to conduct an engineering time study to determine why the
firm's electricians were spending so much time standing around at a
construction site. Management was convinced that the electricians were
lazy and unmotivated. I agreed to assign the project to one of my
graduate students who had a degree in mechanical engineering.
His investigation showed that the electricians were standing around
because they had all been scheduled to work at the same time in the same
closet-sized space. 18 Further investigation showed that the problem
stemmed directly from poor scheduling, which in turn resulted from the
lack of a common database for engineering blueprints. As the project
progressed, engineering changes were usually approved because of
customer requests or because doorways were moved and wires and ducts
Because updated blueprints were not available to the
rerouted.
contractors' site supervisors at the same time, it was not unusual for a
doorway to be moved by one contractor only to find air-conditioning
ducts, pipes, and wires running through the opening. What appeared at
first to be a lazy, unmotivated work force was in fact a problem with the
system.
An analogous situation exists where ethical lapses occur. Although
individuals are ultimately responsible for their choices, people who are
neither incompetent, nor evil, frequently make bad choices. Pressures
influencing their decisions result from structural and systemic forces, as
well as from their ethical values. Replacing personnel without correcting
the system will only result in repetition of the failure with a different cast
of actors. Adding additional rules without changing the system will only
result in increased adherence to the rules, i.e., in goal displacement. We
now turn our attention to the identification of the major sources of these

16.

W. EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF THE CRISIS (1986).

17.

Id.

18. Donald S. Mayes, A Study in Construction Scheduling and Productivity: A Field
Study (1995) (unpublished Masters Thesis, Penn State Harrisburg) (on file with author).
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pressures.
E.

Sources of Pressureson EngineeringDecision Makers

In order to talk about organizational structure, social psychologists
and sociologists have developed a theoretical construct called the
"role." 9 Much like a role in a play or motion picture that can be filled
by a succession of actors who follow the same script, yet still manage to
interpret it, organizational roles consist of a cluster of duties and
expectations that could potentially be performed by any person who
occupies the role. Most role theorists consider the role to be the basic
building block of organizational structure.
For example, the
organizational chart of a typical organization consists of sets of work
roles interconnected in some meaningful and patterned way.
Each of these roles in an organization is linked, or "coupled," to
other roles in various systematic ways. Occupants of closely coupled
roles, known as "role sets," have role expectations. Role expectations
consist of beliefs and attitudes about what a role incumbent in the role set
should or should not do while acting in a particular capacity. These role
expectations are communicated or "sent" to a role incumbent by
members of the role set in various direct and indirect ways. Role
pressures are attempts to influence, communicated by supervisors or
colleagues in such a way as to bring about conformity with the
expectations of the role set. Although the terms have precise technical
meanings in the literature, for present purposes, we will take the terms
"job" and "work role" to have essentially the same meaning and will use
them interchangeably. The terms "position" and "office" are also closely
related concepts that will be taken to have essentially the same meaning.
Pressures impinging on the behavior of those attempting to make
ethical choices emanate from four levels within an organization and from
one external source. These are: individual, job or work role, group,
organization, and environment. Additionally, pressures arise from crosslevel processes, such as a customer (external enviromnent) exerting
pressure on an engineer (work role), or a technological breakthrough
(external environment) that threatens to make an engineer's skills
obsolete (individual). Levels and cross-level pressures, shown below in
Figure 2, include: intrapersonal pressures (pressures generated internally
by an individual); interpersonal pressures (pressures from other
individuals); job or work role pressures (job-related pressures);
intragroup pressures (pressures from a peer group or work group);

19. See ROBERT L. KAHN ET AL.,
CONFLICT AND AMBIGUITY (1964).

ORGANIZATIONAL STRESS:

STUDIES IN ROLE

2003]

WHY GOOD ENGINEERS MAKE BAD DECISIONS

intergroup pressures (group-to-group pressures); intra-organizational
pressures (organizational pressures); interorganizational pressures
(organization-to-organization pressures); and environmental pressures
(pressures generated by the interaction of elements of an organization's
technical, task, and political environments, especially customers,
competitors, suppliers, special interest groups, financial institutions,
professional organizations, governments, technology, the "economy,"
and the "market").
Figure 2. Individual and Structural Pressures for Ethical and NonEthical Behavior
Ethical or Non-Ethical
Behavior(s)
Organizational Level
Ethical Choice
Intra-personal
-An engineer who
Classic ethical dilemma
in which an individual
submits a substandard
must choose from
design in order to meet a
among two or more
deadline.
-An engineer who allows
unpleasant alternatives.
Also included here are
his skills to become
choices among equally
obsolete.
positive alternatives and -An engineer who
the more practical case
dislikes travel yet takes a
of selecting among
job that requires
alternatives that have
extensive travel to obtain
both positive and
higher pay.
negative characteristics.
Inter-personal
Ethical choices
-An engineer who
involving a difference in attempts to hire another
attitudes, values, or
engineer from another
goals of two or more
employer by means of
individuals.
false or misleading
information.
-An engineer who falsely
or maliciously attempts to
injure the reputation,
prospects, practices, or
employments of another
engineer.
-An engineer who uses
the work of another
engineer without proper
attribution.
-An engineer who aids
Y

t"

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:1

and abets the unlawful
practice of engineering by
an individual or firm.

i

Intra-group

Ethical Actions among
members of the same
group.

Inter-group

Ethical Actions among
members of different
groups.

Intra-sender

Inter-sender

Ethical conflict arises
when mixed messages
are received from the
same member of the
role set.
The classical "man in
the middle" situation,
Ethical pressures that
arise when expectations
from one role sender
oppose expectations
from another role
sender,

i
-An engineer in
governmental, industrial,
or educational employ
who incorrectly reviews
the work of other
engineers.
-An engineer who is a
member of a project team
or design group who does
not contribute a fair share
of time or effort.
-An engineer whose
judgment is overruled
under circumstances that
could endanger life or
property and doesn't
report it to appropriate
authority.
-An engineer reveals
facts, data, or information
that is the property of a
client or employer.
-An engineer's supervisor
demands reduced costs
with no decrease in
safety.
-An engineering project
team leader whose
supervisor is pressuring
for a completed project
while the working
engineers are pressuring
for more time to better
resolve design problems.
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Inter-role

The classical situation
in which expectations
for one role conflict
with expectations for
another role occupied
by the same person.

Intra-organizational

The situation in which
different sub-units of an
organization, such as
the engineering and
manufacturing
departments, come into
conflict

An engineer who is a
member of the township
board of supervisors, and
participates in the
solicitation of services
provided by an
organization in which
they are a principal or
officer.
-Design engineers,
manufacturing engineers,
and sales engineers fail to
provide needed
information on a timely
basis in order to make the
other department "look
bad."

Inter-organizational

The classical economic
model of competitive
behavior.

Environmental

The situation in which
choices have to be made
about elements of the
external environment.
The situation in which
there is not a good "fit"
between the person and
the work role.

Person- Role

Person-Group

The classic case of the
"rate busters" and the
"chiselers."

-Union-company
confrontation.
-Unethical competition
among companies.
-Misrepresentation of the
quality of a firm's
products by its
competitors.
Collusion between
engineers or firms to fix
bids or restrict trade.
An engineer who
undertakes an assignment
for which he is not
qualified by education or
experience in the
technical fields involved.
An engineer who violates
the expectations of the
group by performing well
above the standard, or
who allows the group to
"carry" him

Person-Organization

The situation in which

An engineer who is aware
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one person attempts to
"fight city hall". A
"whistle-blower."

Person-Environment

The situation in which
an engineer's behavior
affects the larger
environment. i.e.,
everything external to
the organization.

OrganizationEnvironment

Organizations are
continually attempting
to adapt to their
environments or change
the environment in ways
favorable to themselves,

of on-going safety
violations in a nuclear
power plant and does not
report it to appropriate
higher authority.
An engineer who
misrepresents the safety
of a design, e.g., nuclear
reactor, spacecraft,
tunnel, airplane, and
thereby fails to hold
paramount the safety,
health, and welfare of the
I public.

An engineering firm that
misrepresents past
accomplishments in its
brochures or other
presentations (i.e.,
engages in false
advertising).

The structural and process sources of pressures affecting
engineering decision makers shown in Figure 2 was developed by first
assigning each of the empirically verified antecedents of behavior in
Figure 1 to each of the organizational levels from which they appear to
emanate. For example, some of the antecedents in Figure 1, such as
attitudes and values, are related to the individual level of analysis. Some
are group related, such as leader behavior, and some have their
underpinnings in organizations, such as policies, rules, and procedures.
The second column in Figure 2 identifies the pressures that are related to
the levels and the cross-level processes. The third column in Figure 2
was derived directly from the nearly six pages of proscribed behavior in
the current code of ethics of the National Society of Professional
Engineers.2 °
A mediator attempting to resolve the issues suggested in the column
labeled "Ethical and Non-Ethical Behavior(s)" in Figure 2 would have to
look far beyond individual idiosyncrasies and personal behavior for a
20. See NAT'L SOC'Y OF PROF. ENG'R, CODE OF ETHIcS (2003), available at
Not all
http://www.nspe.org/ethics/ehl-codepage.asp (last visited Jun. 28, 2003).
engineers are members of NSPE, and numerous other ethical codes could have been used
for this analysis. However, that does not change the points being made here that
pressures on professionals arise from a wide variety of sources, and that professional
codes have recognized this, at least implicitly, by proscribing various behaviors.
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permanent solution to the problems. Certainly, an individual who
commits ethical violations is personally and professionally responsible
and should be sanctioned.
However, this will not cure a
2
"bureaupathological" organization. ' Public health officials attempt to
eliminate the sources of a disease, while at the same time treating the
individuals who contract it. Similarly, senior managers who have
considerable discretion over the structure of their organizations can
redesign them to ameliorate many of the sources of pressure on their
employees that may result in unethical decisions. In the following case
study, we will explore these ideas more concretely and fully.
IV.

A.

Case Study Showing the Impact of Ethical Factors on Engineering
Decisions
22
The ChallengerDisaster

Robert Lund, Vice President for Engineering at Morton Thiokol was
worried.2 3 NASA was counting down for a launch of the Space Shuttle,
24
Challenger, scheduled for the next day, January 28, 1986 at 9:38 a.m.
21. The great German sociologist, Max Weber, was dissatisfied with the
inefficiency, corruption, and nepotism prevalent in business and military organizations
during the latter part of the nineteenth century and developed a theory of an "ideal type"

organization, which he called a "bureaucracy." See MAX WEBER: THE THEORY OF SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Talcott
Parsons ed., 1964). The bureaucracy was distinguished by such characteristics as a
hierarchy of: authority; separation of personal and official affairs; and conduct of
business by documents, records, and reports in accordance with stipulated rules that are
clear, impersonal, and universally applied. Id. The bureaucracy also includes a
specialization of labor with clear lines of authority and responsibility. Id. Officials are
full time employees who are appointed on the basis of qualifications, rewarded by regular
salary, and promoted on the basis of competence and merit. Id.
Although Weber's bureaucracy solved many problems, it never became the
model of efficiency that he envisioned. Dysfunctional consequences intervened such as
impersonal behavior, strong attachment to a unit's goals rather than those of the larger
organization, resistance to change, an exaggerated expression of control by officials, and
a routinization of problem solving. See VICTOR A. THOMPSON, MODERN ORGANIZATION:
A GENERAL THEORY 153 (1961). Victor Thompson has referred to these behaviors as
bureaupathetic, and the organizations in which they occur as bureaupathological. Id.
22. This synopsis draws upon the following publicly available sources: OSCAR
HAUPTMAN, THE FINAL VOYAGE OF THE CHALLENGER (1990); DIANE VAUGHAN, THE
CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND

DEVIANCE AT

NASA (1996); Investigation of the Challenger Accident: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong. (1986), available at
http://vww.gpoaccess.gov/challenger (last modified June 18, 2003); PRESIDENTIAL
COMM'N ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER, ACCIDENT REP. (1986),

available at

http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/5I-l/docs/rogers-commission/table-ofcontents.html.
23. See sources cited supra note 22.
24. See sources cited supra note 22.
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Because the temperature at launch was predicted to be close to freezing,
Morton Thiokol engineers were concerned that the rubber "O-rings" that
sealed the different segments of the solid rocket booster would not seal
properly z5 If this happened, hot gasses could escape from the joints
between segments of the booster, possibly
causing a catastrophic failure
26
of the spacecraft and loss of the crew.
The solid rocket booster used by the Challenger was essentially a
149-foot long cylinder, twelve feet in diameter and weighing two million
pounds.27 It was made up of four segments, which were shipped from
Utah and assembled at the launch site. 28 The segmented design required
an elaborate mechanical latching mechanism at each joint to hold the
segments together and seal off the extreme pressures encountered while
the booster was firing. 29 The design used a clevis and tang joint; the
clevis is essentially a deep, U-shaped groove machined into the rim of
one segment; a tang on the rim of an adjacent segment resembles a long
tongue, designed to fit snugly inside the clevis when the two parts are
mated together. 30 The joint was secured by 177 high-strength steel pins,
one inch in diameter, which were inserted through holes in the tang and
clevis around the circumference of the casing. 31
Two concentric Viton rubber O-rings were placed in tiny grooves
machined into the clevis to ensure a tight pressure seal. 32 The rubber 0rings were protected from combustion gasses by a thermal barrier of
asbestos-filled, zinc chromate putty. 33 The designers believed that under
pressure of combustion, the putty would flow sufficiently to force the 0rings into the gap between the tang and clevis, thereby ensuring a good
seal. 34 This was particularly important because of a phenomenon
observed during ignition known as "joint rotation. 3 5 This caused the
tang and clevis to bend away from each other, opening the joint and
reducing sealing pressure on the O-rings.3 6
It was well know that the O-rings did not seal perfectly.37 There
were numerous documented cases of erosion in the primary, and even in

25.
26.

See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.

27.

See sources cited supra note 22.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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the secondary O-rings because of excessive heating. 38 Because this
erosion had frequently occurred on previous flights without incident, it
came to be expected and was no longer treated as an anomaly to be
resolved before a flight could take place. 39 It was also known that the 0rings lost elasticity at lower temperatures.40 However, it was not known
how this loss of elasticity would affect the capability of the O-rings to
respond to the clevis-opening rate or to maintain a pressure seal of the
joints.4 A mission had never been launched
when the temperature was
42
Fahrenheit.
degrees
below fifty-three
Because of these concerns about the O-rings and the potentially
grave consequences involved, the Morton Thiokol engineers
recommended a flight postponement. 43 Lund, the Vice President for
Engineering at Morton Thiokol, agreed with the recommendation, and
Morton Thiokol advised NASA during a 5:45 p.m. conference call that
that the flight should be postponed until at least noon.4 4 Lund and his
staff met again at 8:15 p.m. to discuss the relevant charts and data and to
prepare to justify the decision to upper management at Morton Thiokol.4 5
A telephone conference call took place at 8:45 p.m. between Morton
Thiokol and NASA engineers and managers from Marshal Space Flight
Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and Kennedy Space Center on Merit
Island, Florida.46 In addition to Lund and ten of his engineers, the
teleconference was attended by Lund's supervisor, Jerald E. Mason,
Senior Vice President Wasatch Operations, and two other Morton
Thiokol vice presidents.47
The outcome of this conference call is well known. The Morton
Thiokol engineers had little quantitative data to support their position.48
Their argument was essentially that they were sailing into uncharted
territory, with no experience base to draw upon to make predictions
about what would happen if they launched below fifty-three degrees.4 9
Although they could not provide exact numbers, Morton Thiokol argued
that launches at lower temperatures were surely more problematic than
launches at higher temperatures. 50 After a lengthy and sometimes heated
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
See sources cited supra note 22.
One Morton Thiokol engineer described launching at lower temperatures as
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discussion, during which their interpretation of the data was questioned,
Morton Thiokol requested an off-line caucus. 5 The goal of the off-line
caucus was to reassess the data and take into account the contrary
arguments made during the phone conference.52
Mason opened the caucus by saying that a management decision
was necessary. 53 Two of the engineers then attempted to press the case
to oppose the launch.54 Although they had qualitative data in the form of
photographs of damaged O-rings, they were unable to present any
conclusive quantitative data.55 Finally, Mason turned to Lund and said:
"It's time to take off your engineering hat and put on your management
hat., 56 The managers then proceeded to develop the arguments in favor
of the launch.57 At 11:05 p.m., they rejoined the conference call and
announced their decision to NASA. 58
The shuttle was launched at 11:38 a.m. on the following day. 59 The
60
temperature at the launch pad was thirty-six degrees Fahrenheit.
Seventy-three seconds into the flight, the Challenger disappeared into a
fireball and a cloud of smoke.61
B.

Did the Engineers or ManagersBehave Unethically?

The unfortunate decision leading to the loss of the Challenger has
been interpreted from a number of different perspectives. The simplest
explanation is that it stems from an ethical failure on the part of Morton
Thiokol's managers. At an interview following the loss of the space
shuttle, Mason was asked what he meant when he told Lund to "put on
his management hat." He replied:
And my message was intended to be that we had all been
spending our time there as engineers, looking at numbers and
calculations and so forth. We now had to take that information
and do some management with it.

.

.

. I think there's

engineering management that has to take place, where you take

"moving away from goodness." VAUGHAN, supra note 22, at 317.
51. See sources cited supra note 22.
52. See sources cited supra note 22.
53. VAUGHAN, supra note 22, at 316.
54. See sources cited supra note 22.
55. See sources cited supra note 22.
56. See VAUGHAN, supra note 22, at 318 (citing the interview transcripts of Larry H.
Sayer and Brian Russell of Morton Thiokol, Inc.).
57. See sources cited supra note 22.
58. See sources cited supra note 22.
59. See sources cited supra note 22.
60. See sources cited supra note 22.
61. See sources cited supra note 22.
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62
engineering data and make a management decision with it.

The O-rings had never failed before, and the engineers were unable
to demonstrate with mathematical precision that they would fail this
time. 63 A managerial decision had to be made that would assign greater
weight to non-technical issues such as overtime costs, contract
responsibilities, and the possibility of customer displeasure. A strong
argument can be made that this did not constitute either unethical
behavior or even bad judgment. 64 All of the reporting rules were
followed. Everyone worked as hard as they could; yet, disaster
happened. Although the world of engineering appears to be predictable
and rational, it is really a world of probabilities. Unfortunately,
engineers, like managers, never know anything with total precision.
Engineers consistently include safety factors and redundancies in their
designs to accommodate twenty percent power surges, fifty-year winds,
or one hundred-year floods.
Other reasons given by researchers and writers for the Challenger
failure include: poor engineering analysis, communications failure
(particularly use of a conference telephone call rather than face-to-face
'' 66 While all
conversation), 65 and a phenomenon known as "groupthink.
of these explanations have some merit, none is totally satisfactory in
explaining what happened.67
Another stream of research and comment finds the cause of the
Challenger failure deeply rooted in NASA's organizational structure and
culture, and in the political and economic contingencies facing it. Diane
Vaughan has argued that prior policy decisions of top administrators
62. VAUGHAN, supra note 22, at 319 (citing the interview transcript of Jerald Mason
of Morton Thiokol, Inc.).
63. In fact, the post-disaster analysis revealed that although the 0-rings had been
badly charred at launch, they had sealed the joint, and except for violent wind shear
dislodging the material, the tragedy might have been averted. See id. at 391.
64. See id. at 33-76, 334-86. In this remarkable work of scholarship, Vaughan
returned to the original sources to produce what is likely to be the definitive account of
the human and organizational causes of the tragedy.
65. See KARL E. WEICK, MAKING SENSE OF THE ORGANIZATION 333 (2001).
66. James K. Esser & Joanne S. Lindoerfer, Groupthink and the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident: Towards a Quantative Case Analysis, 2 J.OF BEHAv. DECISION

MAKING 167-77 (1989);

see IRVING JANUS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS (1982). Groupthink is the observed

tendency in highly cohesive groups, with directive leadership, operating in a complex,
changing, and stressful environment to attempt to reach consensus at any cost. See id.
Signs of groupthink include: an illusion of invulnerability, excessive optimism, extreme
risk taking, collective rationalization, unquestioned belief in the team's inherent morality,
pressure on team members to conform, self-censorship, a shared illusion of unanimity,
and self appointed "mind guards" to protect the team from disconfirming external
information. See id.
67. See VAUGHAN, supra note 22.
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established a structural and organizational culture that provided a context
for decision making of all its participants, both managers and
engineers. 68 In organizations involved in risky work, where the cost of a
failure is high (e.g., surgery, firefighting, child placement, FAA flight
control), "error-reducing activities have concentrated on the decisionmaking situation and the individuals who participated in it. Much less
attention-if any-is paid to the organization system and its environment
69
as they contribute to decision errors."
Sociologist Charles Perrow investigated accidents in a number of
systems having high potential for catastrophic failure, such as nuclear
power plants and weapons systems, aircraft and airways, dams, mines,
and facilities involved with the production and transportation of
explosive and toxic materials. 70 He labeled these "high risk" systems
and suggested that, because of two particular characteristics of these
systems, accidents in them are inevitable and even "normal.'
Our task,
he argued, is to stop blaming the wrong people when things go wrong;
instead, we should abandon the systems we cannot fix and fix those
systems that can be fixed, but only in ways that do not make them
riskier. 72 The two characteristics that Perrow suggests inevitably lead to
accidents in high-risk systems are the interactive complexity of the
system and the tightness of the coupling of its components.73 A complex
system has many branches, loops, and feedback channels; when these are
tightly coupled, there is no time for human intervention to make
corrections. 74 Perrow writes in this connection:
Conventional explanations for accidents use notions such as operator
error; faulty design or equipment; lack of attention to safety features;
lack of operating experience; inadequately trained personnel; failure
to use the most advanced technology; systems that are too big, under
financed, or poorly run. We have already encountered ample
evidence of these problems causing accidents. But something more
basic and important contributes to the failure of systems .... What is

68. Diane Vaughan, The Trickle-Down Effect: Policy Decisions, Risky Work, and the
ChallengerTragedy, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 80-102 (Winter 1997).
69. Id. at 81.
70.
(1999).

71.
72.
73.

CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIvrNG WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES

Id.
Id.

Id. Using computer simulation models and role-playing volunteers, cognitive
psychologist Dietrich Dorner has arrived at conclusions strikingly consistent with
Perrow's regarding the unintended consequences of complexity in social systems. See
DIETRICH DORNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE: RECOGNIZING AND AVOIDING ERROR IN

COMPLEX SITUATIONS (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1996).
74. PERROW, supranote 70, at 63.
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needed is an explanation based upon system characteristics.

75

C. The Problem ofAlignment
Among the system characteristics that have been shown to impact
on decision-making effectiveness are task interdependencies, role and
status relationships, jurisdictional ambiguities, communications
inadequacies, performance requirements and reward systems, structural
differentiation, and integrative mechanisms.76 Organizing these and
other variables into one or more sets of mutually supportive relationships
is often referred to as the problem of "alignment."
Howard Gardner and his colleagues argue that alignment of four
components of professional realms must be present for a profession to
arise and develop. 77 The first three components are: individuals who
choose to enter the profession, obtain training, and pursue their personal
goals; an identifiable domain of specialized knowledge and practice
together with an ethical dimension credible to the public; and fields, or
These
persons, who actually practice a domain's procedures. 78
and
expert practitioners,
gatekeepers,
include
practitioners
students/apprentices. 79 The fourth component is comprised of "other
stakeholders," that is, elements of the realm's external environment such80
public.
as corporate shareholders and executives, and the general
Gardner and his colleagues conclude:
A professional realm is healthiest when the values of the culture are
in line with those of the domain, when the expectations of
stakeholders match those of the field, and when the domain and the
field are themselves in sync. When these conditions exist, individual
practitioners are free to operate at their best, morale is high, and the
profession flourishes. We term this a situation of authentic
alignment.81
Managers and organizational theorists are also making use of the
concept of alignment. For example, it is widely held that an organization
must "fit," or be aligned with, and serve a useful function for its external
environment if it is to obtain needed resources, a ready market for its
products and services, and acceptance of its waste products. Aligned
Id.
See any advanced text on Organizational Behavior, such as
JOHN W. SLOCUM, JR., ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (10th ed. 2003).
77. GARDNER ET AL., supra note 5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 27.
75.
76.
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organizations produce goods and services by environmentally enhancing
processes, and by means satisfying to their employees and other
stakeholders. More formally:
The term "alignment" refers to consistency of plans, processes,
information, resource decisions, actions, results, analysis, and
learning to support key organizational-wide goals.
Effective
alignment requires a common understanding of purposes and goals
and use of complementary measures and information for planning,
tracking, analysis, and improvement at three levels:
the
82
organizational level, the key process level, and the work unit level.
D. Did Lack ofAlignment Contribute to the Shuttle Disaster?
Our analysis has suggested that many unethical decisions have their
root causes in the characteristics of the system in which they are made,
particularly the complexity and tightness of coupling of system
components, lack of alignment between system components, and lack of
alignment between the organization and its environment. We now turn
our attention to the synthesis of some of these ideas, and conclude with
some suggestions for ADR professionals.
The conceptual framework used to provide the synthesis is derived
from the socio-technical systems perspective, which considers the
interrelations among the individual, the job, the work group, the larger
organizational infrastructure, and the external environment.
This
perspective views organizations as consisting of two interactive and
83
interdependent systems: a technical system and a social system.
The technical system is comprised of the tools, techniques,
machines, and equipment organized in some predetermined way, which
are linked by the patterned flow of information, materials, and energy.
These patterns, when interpreted by a skilled observer, constitute the
structure of the technical system. The technical system, designed and
understood by engineers and technical managers in terms of physical
reality, obeys the laws of physics, chemistry, and mathematics. The
design criterion for the technical system is efficiency of work,
operationalized in terms of maximization of profit/value added or
82. BALDRIGE NAT'L QUALITY PROGRAM, CRITERIA FOR PERFORMANCE EXCELLENCE
30 (2003) (on file with author).
83. See THE SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: A TAVISTOCK ANTHOLOGY,
VOLUME II: THE SOCIO-TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE (Eric Trist & Hugh Murray eds., 1993);
Melvin Blumberg & Antone Alber, The Human Element: Its Impact on the Productivity
of Advanced Manufacturing Systems, I J. OF MFG. SYSTEMS 43-52 (1982); E.L. Trist et
al., An Experiment in Autonomous Working in an American UndergroundCoal Mine, 30
HUMAN RELATIONS 201-36 (1977).
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minimization of cost/time. NASA's technical system operated in a
dynamic, uncertain, and often unpredictable environment. Because the
shuttle vehicle itself was constantly changing as a result of flight stress
and strain, it was impossible to predict and simulate all post-launch
contingencies in the laboratory. In the early days of the program, NASA
relied heavily on "in-house" technical expertise, precise quantitative
analysis, and rigorous testing. Later, reliance shifted to extensive
outsourcing, with NASA engineers taking on more of an oversight role
with external contractors rather than direct engineering involvement with
the shuttle.
The social system consists of people, their values, beliefs, attitudes,
needs, fantasies, emotions, acts, and interactions. Social structure
emerges from the patterned behavior of individuals and groups as they
interact with each other and their tasks, and respond to external
pressures. The social system is understood in terms of the subjective
reality explored by psychologists, sociologists, and other behavioral
scientists. Criteria for social system effectiveness are usually expressed
in terms of need (or job) satisfaction, achievement, motivation, personal
learning, growth, responsibility, hope for the future, meaning, and
control. NASA's social system was a classical, rigid, productionoriented bureaucracy. A proliferation of rules governed every aspect of
the work process and engineers complained of being buried in a blizzard
of paperwork. There is a strong suggestion that goal displacement was
taking place. The rules were no longer a means to some desirable end;
they seemed to take on lives of their own, becoming ends in themselves
and often a means to protect and advance a career.
There was, and apparently still is, a lack of alignment between
NASA's technology and the organized behavior of the humans who must
control it. To achieve this alignment, managers must create work
designs that jointly satisfy the social and psychological needs of humans
while simultaneously providing them with the ability to control variation
in the technical system. NASA's technology operates in a dynamic,
NASA's social
uncertain, and often unpredictable environment.
structure, a rigid bureaucracy demanding strict adherence to policies and
rules, record keeping, and coordination through the chain of command,
simply cannot respond to the technology quickly enough when its
controllers go out of control. There is now abundant research suggesting
that a dynamic, uncertain technology is best controlled by a dynamic,
flexible, adaptive social system comprised of interacting self-regulating
(or autonomous) work teams.84 Rather than focusing on individual jobs,
84. See, e.g., Melvin Blumberg, Job Switching in Autonomous Work Groups: An
Exploratory Study in a Pennsylvania Coal Mine, 23 ACADEMY OF MGMT. J. 287-306
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the self-regulating work team emphasizes the development of mutually
supportive work roles so employees can respond to job demands and
adapt to stress. The team is designed to be internally led, self-regulating,
and self-contained with the requisite skills necessary for process control,
maintenance, and adjustment contained within the unit.
The launch decision was arrived at through a four-level flight
readiness review that involved sometimes heated and adversarial public
confrontations intended to assess engineering risk. This review appears
to have been a vestige remaining from the development of the Apollo
and Gemini programs, a period when NASA was considerably less
bureaucratic and had superlative in-house technical expertise. Although
adversarial approaches surely have their use, they are not the best
approach in situations where cooperation and collaboration is needed.
This is particularly true in bureaupathological, misaligned organizations
in which people tend to be rewarded for following the rules rather than
accomplishing the mission.
A contributing factor was that NASA's top managers were far
removed from the locus of risk. In this case, they were too far removed
from an evolving, experimental technology. Through a process known
as "uncertainty adsorption," in which "inferences are drawn from a body
of evidence and the inferences, instead of the evidence itself, are then
communicated, ' 8 5 the inherent messiness, and sometimes agonizing
uncertainty of decisions, was peeled away. Senior officials heard only
the results of the decision, but did not experience the strong reservations
and split vote that accompanied it.
V.

Conclusions and Implications for ADR Professionals

Although it is clear that individuals in the case study made bad
decisions, it is less clear that these were the result of ethical failures on
the part of either engineers or engineering managers. There also appear
to be broader issues at work. Personal responsibility and authority for
decisions about the spacecraft was clearly defined; however, it is unclear
who was responsible for making decisions about the organizational
system itself. Budget cuts, demand for "performance," inadequate
checks on policy decisions, such as declaring the system "operational"
and sufficiently safe for non-astronaut passengers, all contributed to
(1980); Thomas Cummings & Melvin Blumberg, Advanced Manufacturing Technology
and Work Design, in TOBY D. WALL ET AL., THE HUMAN SIDE OF ADVANCED
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (1987). See also R. KRAFT, UTILIZING SELF MANAGING
TEAMS: EFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR OF TEAM LEADERS (1999); R. PURSER & S. CABANA, THE
SELF-MANAGING ORGANIZATION: How LEADING COMPANIES ARE TRANSFORMING THE
WORK OF TEAMS FOR REAL IMPACT (1999).
85. MARCH & SIMON, supra note 14, at 165.
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NASA's drift away from the "direction of goodness." There was a high
degree of control over well-structured and well-defined decisions.
However, the processes that managers used to make the kind of decisions
that they are frequently called on to make, namely, less well-structured
and less well-defined decisions, were poorly controlled or overly
simplistic.
Early NASA exhibited many of the characteristics of what Chris
Argyris and Peter Senge have called a "learning organization." 86 These
are characterized by continuous improvement of every organizational
experience utilizing constructive dissent, and fact based decision making
embedded in a learning cycle of planning, implementing, reviewing, and
revising.87 On the other hand, contemporary NASA appears to resemble
more closely what Michael E. McGill and John W. Slocum, Jr. have
called a "knowing organization," characterized by a dedication to
best way." 88
achieve its goals by finding and implementing the "one
After the one best way has been found and implemented, standardized
processes, limited and highly focused discussion and dissent, and
incremental improvement are established to maintain it. 89 Knowing
organizations that fail to meet their goals by following standardized
procedures typically refine their procedures rather than directly
that caused the procedures to become outmoded
addressing the problems
90
and the goals unmet.
What implications can be drawn from all of this for the emerging
Collectively, ADR professionals have surely
field of ADR?
demonstrated a high sense of personal responsibility and professional
behavior in the face of a number of troubling issues that gave rise to the
symposium of which this paper is a part. However praiseworthy their
personal value systems are, ADR professionals are at sea in much the
same torrent of pressures as the NASA engineers. Among the issues
faced by the engineers were organizational policies, rules and
procedures, authoritarian supervisors, and a lack of alignment of the
technology of the organization and the social system that controlled it.
Analogously, ADR professionals must cope with the tendency of public
officials to refer cases to ADR because it is an inexpensive alternative to
litigation, giving rise to concerns that there may be a misalignment
between the problem and the problem-solving technique; the demand for
86. CHRIS ARGYRIS, ON ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING (2d ed. 1999); PETER SENGE,
THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS (1994).
87. ARGYRIS, supra note 86; SENGE, supra note 86.

88.

Michael E. McGill & John W.

DYNAMICS 67-79 (1993).

89.
90.
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Slocum, Jr., Unlearningthe Organization, ORG.
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"performance," using cost effectiveness criteria that may not be
appropriate; a lack of participation by the parties at ADR hearings
possibly transforming the hearings into a form of attorney-centered
negotiation, losing the discipline and safeguards of a courtroom
procedure without a concomitant savings in time and cost; and persons
serving as mediators without adequate training.
In addition to these systemic or environmental problems, ADR
practitioners face more micro challenges that stem, at least in part, from
the nature of the mediation process itself, particularly as many attorneys
practice it. Attorneys are trained in the use of the adversarial approach as
their primary paradigm for eliciting and verifying facts, and for
proposing inferences about the truth. However, the adversarial approach,
which has worked so well in litigation, exhibits many of the
characteristics of trained incapacity when applied to the mediation
process. The goal in an adversarial relationship is to reduce, restructure,
or simply ignore ambiguity in an attempt to transform it into a feasible
set of absolutes having clearly differentiated choices and outcomes. The
basic standards for arriving at the truth in litigation, such as
"preponderance of the evidence" or "beyond a reasonable
doubt,"
suggest that an attorney is attempting to adsorb uncertainty for a jury.
This uncertainty adsorption occurs by an attorney selecting the facts to
be presented, providing inferences drawn from the facts, and proposing
that the inferences, perhaps more than the facts themselves, should
provide the underpinnings for a jury's determination of the truth.
On the other hand, mediators are not attempting to deal with
absolutes in a "guilty" or "not guilty," win or lose situation. Rather,
mediators attempt to achieve equilibrium, or at least agreement between
the parties. This can best be done if the mediator is able to exercise
sensitivity to the values and subculture of an organization and a tolerance
for its ambiguity, rather than attempt to adsorb it. Mediators search for
what Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon has termed a "satisficing" solution,
which is a solution that may not be optimal but is still "good enough." 9 1
A mediated solution may not reflect truth, justice, or even reality, other
than the subjective reality understood by the parties that they have
achieved the most acceptable solution that they are likely to get.
A central theme of this paper has been that the "pathology" did not
reside only in the people and their relationships, but also in the structure
of the organization itself. Unfortunately, mediators are usually called in
after the fact when damage has already been done, in an attempt to
restore some equilibrium to a given situation. However, there appears to
be another, valid role for mediation before the fact. Although it is
91.

HERBERT A. SIMoN, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 118-20 (4th ed. 1997).
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doubtful that a mediator could have changed the outcome of the
Challenger launch decision at the time it was being made, a skilled
mediator could have assisted in resolving and eliminating the enabling
factors that gave rise to the decision. For example, the center column of
Figure 2 labeled "Ethical Choice" identifies a number of ethical
dilemmas that can be subjected to mediation before they enable the NonEthical Behavior(s) shown in the third column. Elsewhere in this
symposium issue, Joseph R. Herkert argues for an expansion of the field
of engineering ethics into such areas as risk and product liability,
sustainable
development,
healthcare,
information
technology,
contracting, regulation, and technology transfer. 92 These would also
appear to be promising areas in which mediators could be of significant
help as before the fact problem solvers.
It seems clear that decisions currently being made, and left unmade,
by ADR practitioners and others are creating a culture and structure that
will inevitably provide a context for future decisions. 93 The time seems
ripe for ADR practitioners to take ownership of, and responsibility for,
the development of the ADR system. If they do not, others will, and the
results may not be to their liking.
Many of the problems raised at the symposium appear to be
amenable to solution by means of a professional association through
which the collective wisdom and experience of ADR practitioners can be
focused and amplified. As ADR matures, its practitioners will likely
develop recommended competencies and skill sets for new entrants into
its various sub-fields. In the interim, ADR professionals working in
organizations
might
consider
developing
competencies
in
communications, motivation, team building, and group processes.
Perhaps these disciplines could be offered as elective courses in legal
education programs and as continuing education training for

92. Joseph R. Herkert, Biting the Apple (but Not Inhaling): Lessons from
Engineering Ethics for Alternative Dispute Resolution Ethics, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 119,

126 (2003).
93. For example, the United States government has already taken significant steps in
shaping the form of ADR in the public sector through enactment of legislation, executive
orders, and agency regulation. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996
requires that every federal agency adopt a policy for the implementation and use of ADR.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-81 (2003). The Act also recommends against the use of ADR in
certain situations, including: situations in which a precedent might be set that is not likely
to be generally accepted; situations involving significant issues of government policy that
require wider input for their resolution; situations where ADR may not produce
individual decisions consistent with established policies; situations where individuals or
organizations that are not a party to the dispute may be affected; situations where a full,
public record can not be guaranteed and situations where the agency might not be able to
maintain control over the outcome of the dispute with the authority to alter its disposition
as circumstances change. See id. § 572(b).
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practitioners.
There seems to be a tendency for scientific disciplines that are
making rapid strides to do so by "feeding on" the discoveries of other
fields. For example, during the first half of the twentieth century, the
fields of chemistry and physics were making enormous progress, not
only because their investigators were making great discoveries, but also
because they quickly incorporated the discoveries of each other's fields
into their own theoretical models and continued to "leap-frog" each other
for some years. One outcome of this process of intellectual crossfertilization was the development of the new field of physical chemistry.
The field of ADR appears to be in such a position. ADR is
multifaceted and heterogeneous.
Its practitioners use different
theoretical models for mediation and have diverse backgrounds and
training. They work from different power bases, including legislative
authority, court-mandated resolution, individual expertise, and charisma,
to resolve differences and implement agreements. Deeply rooted in the
ethical values of equality, fairness, and justice, ADR is in a unique
position to contribute to and draw upon the literature and practices of
such areas as conflict resolution in social psychology, negotiation and
mediation in the field of labor relations, as well as the interpersonal,
communications,
and change management areas of business
administration.

